LATAM Blog: China Lets Maduro Sink Without Confronting US Warships

The Symbolism and Substance of China-Venezuela Relations

Nicolás Maduro's recent public display of a Huawei phone, allegedly a gift from Chinese President Xi Jinping, was more than a theatrical gesture. During a speech, he mimicked a satellite call to Beijing, using phrases like "ni hao" and "xiexie," which sent a clear message to Washington: Venezuela has powerful allies. However, this symbolic act contrasts with the more complex reality of China-Venezuela relations, where diplomatic rhetoric often diverges from practical considerations.

The U.S. has increased its pressure on Venezuela, with destroyers patrolling Caribbean waters and the Trump administration raising the bounty on Maduro’s head to $50 million, accusing him of being one of the largest narco-traffickers in the world. In response, China has issued muted statements, emphasizing its opposition to the use or threat of force in international relations and interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs. Yet, experts suggest that China’s commitment to its Latin American ally has distinct limits, particularly when it comes to military confrontation with the United States.

Last week, the deployment of U.S. warships, including the USS Gravely, USS Jason Dunham, and USS Sampson, alongside 4,000 marines, prompted diplomatic protests from Beijing. Despite these tensions, the relationship between China and Venezuela remains a subject of intense scrutiny, especially after Maduro’s disputed re-election in July 2024.

Strategic Rhetoric vs. Economic Realities

Javier Corrales, a professor of political science at Amherst College, explains that China fears a transition to democracy or the rule of law in Venezuela would reduce its bargaining power. A Western-aligned government could potentially revise contracts and expose embarrassing dealings. However, Corrales doubts that Beijing would actively intervene to preserve Maduro’s grip on power. He notes that while China may accept economic losses to maintain its presence, Venezuela continues to deliver oil and pay its debt, estimated at around $10 billion in 2024.

The Venezuela-China axis has seemingly strengthened recently, with Communist Party of China delegates visiting Caracas in June to establish “doctrinal training” programs for the Bolivarian ruling socialist party. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yván Gil hailed these exchanges as efforts to build “societies based on social justice” and a “new international order.” Such rhetoric aligns with BRICS principles, but Venezuela’s membership bid was blocked by Brazil due to concerns over the contested election.

Despite this, both governments claim to be preparing over 600 agreements for 2025, covering technology, investment, and agriculture. Nicolás Maduro, the president’s son, and Vice President Delcy Rodríguez have made multiple trips to China to advance these initiatives. However, the gap between political rhetoric and commercial realities remains significant.

Economic Challenges and Strategic Caution

Francisco Monaldi, director of the Latin America Energy Program at Rice University, notes that since former president Hugo Chávez’s death, China has become more cautious with Venezuela. It has not provided any new loans, citing previous bad experiences. The failure of development loans after Chávez met former Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2008 led to incomplete infrastructure projects and contributed to Venezuela’s economic chaos.

Beijing halted new disbursements in 2015 as hyperinflation took hold. According to the China-America Research Center of the Andrés Bello Foundation, Venezuela absorbed nearly half of all Chinese development funding for Latin America, forcing Beijing to restructure payment terms and reconsider its lending practices globally.

Parsifal D’Sola Alvarado, director of the China-America Research Center, suggests that future agreements may focus on Special Economic Zones rather than credit lines. These zones require minimal capital and offer control over production using inexpensive Venezuelan labor. The numbers support this assessment, with Chinese development banks extending $59.2 billion to Venezuela—nearly double Brazil’s allocation—but commercial banks have largely abandoned the country.

Geopolitical Calculus and Regional Dynamics

China’s strategic calculus appears driven more by long-term geopolitical positioning than economic benefit. Javier Corrales notes that Xi Jinping has become more geo-strategic than his predecessor, Hu Jintao. While expanding Chinese business influence and obtaining raw materials, he also seeks greater political presence abroad, regardless of economic costs.

Venezuela, home to the world’s largest oil reserves, offers unique advantages in Latin America. However, China’s engagement in the oil sector remains circumscribed by sanctions concerns. Chinese state oil company CNPC produces about 90,000 barrels daily in Venezuela, but crude destined for China takes a circuitous route through Malaysian intermediaries.

Chinese oil interests have shifted to neighboring Guyana, where the business environment is more attractive. However, tensions over the Essequibo region complicate these investments, as they directly conflict with Venezuela’s territorial ambitions.

Balancing Acts and Future Prospects

Despite its privileged position, China has hedged its bets. As Venezuela’s economy collapsed after 2014, driving millions to flee, Beijing extended enough credit to prevent a sovereign default while opening channels to the opposition. Chinese government-linked entities have hosted opposition figures, and advisers to opposition economists report exploratory meetings with Chinese officials about post-Maduro scenarios.

The latest U.S. military deployment, framed as an anti-narcotics operation targeting the “Cartel of the Suns,” presents a new challenge for Beijing. Analysts suggest that sanctioned countries may seek to join forces, but China’s measured response reflects a broader pattern in its foreign policy.

Gabriel Pastor of Uruguay’s CERES think tank notes that China’s statement is “politically correct” but does not mean it will intervene in the conflict by supporting Venezuela. A democratic transition might ultimately serve Chinese commercial interests better, as a stable and competent government could be more willing to invest.

In the end, China’s support for Venezuela remains symbolic rather than substantial. As Maduro claims to mobilize millions of militia members in response to perceived U.S. threats, Beijing’s stance remains coolly pragmatic. For Maduro, the message from Beijing is clear: symbolic support, yes; military intervention, absolutely not. In the hierarchy of China’s global priorities, preserving an unprofitable Latin American ally ranks well below avoiding direct conflict with the United States.